Philippine Reports Volume Reference

1	8/8/1901	-	2/20/1903
2	2/21/1903	-	11/30/1903
3	12/1/1903	-	4/22/1904
4	4/22/1904	-	9/7/1905
5	9/7/1905	-	3/17/1906
6	3/17/1906	-	11/22/1906
7	11/22/1906	-	3/13/1907
8	3/17/1907	-	10/7/1907
9	10/8/1907	-	1/23/1908
10	1/24/1908	-	4/1/1908
11	7/18/1908	-	11/7/1908
12	11/8/1908	-	2/18/1909
13	2/18/1909	-	8/17/1909
14	8/18/1909	-	1/14/1910
15	1/15/1910	-	3/22/1910
16	3/22/1910	-	9/6/1910
17	9/10/1910	-	12/21/1910
18	12/22/1910	-	3/11/1911

19	3/11/1911	-	8/22/1911
20	8/23/1911	-	12/2/1911
21	12/2/1911	-	2/21/1912
22	2/21/1912	-	7/30/1912
23	8/5/1912	-	11/28/1912
24	12/28/1912	-	3/29/1913
25	7/26/1913	-	10/24/1914
26	10/29/1913	-	2/20/1914
27	3/2/1914	-	9/1/1914
28	9/1/1914	-	12/19/1914
29	12/22/1914	-	2/26/1915
30	2/26/1915	-	3/31/1915
31	3/31/1915	-	10/19/1915
32	10/19/1915	-	12/19/1915
33	12/24/1915	-	2/25/1916
34	2/26/1916	-	9/22/1916
35	9/23/1916	-	12/22/1916
36	1/2/1917	-	10/13/1917

37	10/13/1917	-	4/1/1918
38	4/1/1918	-	10/29/1918
39	11/6/1918	-	8/14/1919
40	8/14/1918	-	3/30/1920
41	7/21/1920	-	3/20/1921

42	7/12/1921	-	2/22/1922
43	2/27/1922	-	10/30/1922
44	11/1/1922	-	4/4/1923
45	7/12/1923	-	4/5/1924
46	4/6/1924	-	12/10/1924
47	12/10/1924	-	9/22/1925
48	9/23/1925	-	3/20/1926
49	3/20/1926	-	2/28/1927
50	3/2/1927	-	10/5/1927
51	10/4/1927	-	8/4/1928
52	8/19/1928	-	3/12/1929
53	3/13/1929	-	10/28/1929
54	10/29/1929	-	10/4/1930
55	10/6/1930	-	8/27/1931

*56	8/27/1931	-	3/31/1932
57	4/5/1932	-	2/28/1933
58	3/1/1933	-	11/29/1933
59	12/1/1933	-	8/31/1935
60	4/2/1934	-	1/1/1935
61	12/1/1934	-	8/31/1935
62	9/2/1935	-	1/1/1936
63	2/28/1936	-	12/29/1936
64	1/14/1937	-	10/29/1937
65	10/30/1937	-	1/30/1938
66	6/30/1938	-	12/17/1938
67	12/2/1938	-	5/5/1939
68	5/5/1939	-	10/18/1939
69	10/18/1939	-	6/12/1940

70	6/13/1940	-	12/5/1940
71	12/5/1940	-	4/21/1941

72	4/22/1941	-	6/28/1941
73	6/30/1941	-	9/30/1942
74	10/12/1942	-	11/27/1942
*75	8/1/1945	-	1/31/1946
76	2/1/1946	-	7/1/1946
77	8/5/1946	-	2/28/1947
78	2/28/1947	-	7/31/1947
79	8/1/1947	-	1/12/1948
*80	1/14/1948	-	5/12/1948
*81	5/13/1948	-	10/26/1948
*82	10/27/1948	-	2/26/1949
83	4/1/1949	-	5/12/1949
*84	6/1/1949	-	11/4/1949
*85	11/11/1949	-	3/31/1950

*86	4/1/1950	-	6/30/1950
87	7/6/1950	-	12/29/1950

*90	9/11/1951	-	2/29/1952
*91	3/5/1952	-	8/5/1952
*92	9/17/1952	-	4/30/1953
*93	5/1/1953	-	10/31/1953
*94	11/5/1953	-	9/30/1954
*95	5/19/1954	-	9/30/1954
*96	10/1/1954	-	4/30/1955
*97	5/6/1955	-	11/28/1955
*98	11/29/1955	-	4/28/1956
*99	5/2/1956	-	9/28/1956
*100	9/17/1956	-	3/29/1957
*101	3/30/1957	-	8/30/1957
*102	9/1/1957	-	2/26/1958
*103	2/28/1958	-	5/30/1958
*104	6/30/1958	-	12/29/1958
*105	1/16/1959	-	1/30/1960
*106	8/7/1959	-	1/30/1960
*107	2/11/1960	-	4/30/1960
*108	5/16/1960	-	7/26/1960
*109	7/27/1960	-	10/31/1960
*110	11/23/1960	-	1/31/1961

111	2/28/1961	-	4/30/1961
112	5/30/1961	-	8/31/1961
113	9/14/1961	-	12/30/1961
114	1/29/1962	-	4/30/1962
115	5/1/1962	-	7/31/1962
116	8/31/1962	-	12/31/1962
*117	1/31/1963	-	4/30/1963
118	5/18/1963	-	11/30/1963
119	12/10/1963	-	4/30/1964
120	5/20/1964	-	12/30/1964
*121	1/1/1965	-	6/30/1965
122	7/1/1965	-	1/30/1966
*123	2/16/1966	-	6/30/1966

Frias v. San Diego-Sison

BOBIE ROSE FRIAS v. FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON 

2007 / Austria-Martinez

On 7 Dec 1990, Bobie Rose Frias and Dr. Flora San-Diego Sison entered into a MOA over Frias’ property

• MOA consideration is 3M
• Sison has 6 months from the date of contract’s execution to notify Frias of her intention to purchase the property with the improvements at 6.4M
• Prior to this 6 month period, Frias may still offer the property to other persons, provided that 3M shall be paid to Sison including interest based on prevailing compounded bank interest + amount of sale in excess of 7M [should the property be sold at a price greater than 7M]
• In case Frias has no other buyer within 6 months from the contract’s execution, no interest shall be charged by Sison on the 3M
• In the event that on the 6^th month, Sison would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has 6 months to pay 3M (amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last 6 months only)
• 3M treated as a loan and the property considered as the security for the mortgage
• Upon notice of intention to purchase, Sison has 6 months to pay the balance of 3.4M (6.4M less 3M MOA consideration)

Frias received from Sison 3M (2M in cash; 1M post-dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale). Frias gave Sison the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. Sison decided not to purchase the property, so she notified Frias through a letter dated March 20, 1991 [Frias received it only on June 11, 1991], and Sison reminded Frias of their agreement that the 2M Sison paid should be considered as a loan payable within 6 months. Frias failed to pay this amount.
Sison filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment. Sison averred that Frias tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of TCT, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition[1] for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy. RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing of a 2M bond.

RTC found that Frias was under obligation to pay Sison 2M with compounded interest pursuant to their MOA. RTC ordered Frias to pay Sison: 

• 2M + 32% annual interest beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid
• 70k representing premiums paid by Sison on the attachment bond with legal interest counted from the date of this decision until fully paid
• 100k moral, corrective, exemplary damages [liable for moral damages because of Frias’ fraudulent scheme]
• 100k attorney’s fees + cost of litigation

CA affirmed RTC with modification—32% reduced to 25%. CA said that there was no basis for Frias to say that the interest should be charged for 6 months only. It said that a loan always bears interest; otherwise, it is not a loan. The interest should commence on June 7, 1991 until fully paid, with compounded bank interest prevailing at the time [June 1991] the 2M was considered as a loan (as certified by the bank). 

ISSUES & HOLDING – Ratio only discusses topic of INTEREST (as per syllabus) 

• WON compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months as contained in the MOA. NO 
• WON Sison is entitled to moral damages. YES 
• WON the grant of attorney’s fees is proper, even if not mentioned in the body of the decision. NO

CA committed no error in awarding an annual 25% interest on the 2M even beyond the 6-month stipulated period. In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only" should be taken in the context of the entire agreement.

SC notes that the agreement speaks of two (2) periods of 6 months each (see FACTS—words in bold & underline). No interest will be charged for the 1^st 6-month period [while Sison was making up her mind], but only for the 2^nd 6-month period after Sison decided not to buy the property. There is nothing in the MOA that suggests that interest will be charged for 6 months only even if it takes forever for Frias to pay the loan.

The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money, and until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. For a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.

CA DECISION AND RESOLUTION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION—Award of attorney’s fees deleted

---

[1] At first, Frias’ petition was granted, but it was eventually set aside, since RTC granted Sison’s petition for relief from judgment (as Sison was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy).

Lawyers Cooperative v. Tabora

LAWYERS COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY v. PERFECTO A. TABORA

1965 / BAUTISTA ANGELO

FACTS

Perfecto Tabora bought from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company a complete set of AmJur, plus a set of AmJur, General Index.

CONTRACT "Title to and ownership of the books shall remain with the seller until the purchase price shall have been fully paid. Loss or damage to the books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer."

Tabora made a partial payment of P300.00, leaving a balance of P1,382.40. The books were delivered and receipted for by Tabora. On the same day, a fire broke out, burning down Tabora’s law office and library. Tabora immediately reported it to LCBC. The company replied and as a token of goodwill it sent to Tabora free of charge 4 Philippine Reports volumes.

As Tabora failed to pay the monthly installments agreed upon, LCBC filed an action to recover of the balance.

TABORA’S CONTENTIONS

• Contract: title to and the ownership of the books shall remain with the seller until the purchase price shall have been fully paid, so LCBC should bear the loss
• Even assuming that the ownership was transferred to Tabora, he should not answer for the loss: force majeure (no evidence that Tabora contributed in any way)

ISSUE & HOLDING

Who bears the loss? Tabora

RATIO

GENERAL RULE The loss of the object of the contract of sale is borne by the owner or in case of force majeure the one under obligation to deliver the object is exempt from liability

• THIS IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE Contract provides that loss or damage after delivery shall be borne by the buyer

FORCE MAJEURE DEFENSE FAILS

The rule only holds true when the obligation consists in the delivery of a determinate thing and there is no stipulation holding him liable even in case of fortuitous event.

• NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE

The obligation is pecuniary in nature, and the obligor bound himself to assume the loss after the delivery.

Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood

JOVITO QUISABA v. STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD [SIMVP]

1974 / Castro

FACTS

Quisaba was an internal auditor of SIMVP for 18 years. On January 1973, SIMVP VP Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant, but Quisaba, he refused to do so, saying that such task is inconsistent with his position. The next day, Hyde informed Quisaba of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out the instructions given. Hyde warned him that failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal.

Quisaba filed a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees against SIMVP and its VP Robert Hyde. Quisaba was NOT asking for backwages nor reinstatement. Quisaba alleged that due to SIMVP’s acts, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation.

SIMVP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI, asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC. Quisaba opposed this, and he informed the court that an NLRC representative said that NLRC has no jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of employee-employer relationship. Nonetheless, CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint involves an employee-employer relation.

ISSUE & HOLDING

Who has jurisdiction over the case? CFI has jurisdiction. This is a CIVIL dispute, not a labor dispute.

RATIO

This case is concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute, as it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and it does not involve an existing employee-employer relation within the meaning of PD 21, Sec. 2(1).

Civil law consists of that mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests.

NLRC jurisdiction is defined by PD 21, Sec. 2.

• All matters involving employee-employer relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under RA 875
• All strikes overtaken by Proc. 1081
• All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations," Quisaba’s complaint is grounded on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal, not on his dismissal per se, as he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages.

The "right" of SIMVP to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, then SIMVP violated the following:

• NCC 1701 – prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other
• NCC 21 – makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy

Moral damages may be recovered in acts and actions referred to in NCC 21. [NCC 2219 (10)]

ORDER SET ASIDE; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Que v. IAC

MAGTANGGOL QUE v. IAC and ANTONIO NICOLAS

1989 / Cruz

Human Relations Torts > Acts Contra Bonus Mores

In 1975, Antonio Nicolas ordered from Magtanggol Que canvass strollers, and Nicolas issued to Que 5 post-dated checks with a total face value of P7,600.00. Nicolas ordered a "stop payment" because of defects in the articles sold which Que had not corrected, so Que was unable to encash the checks.

Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas. The charge was dismissed for lack of merit, as the investigating fiscal held that it was an accounting matter, which did not necessarily involve deceit on Nicolas’ part of Nicolas.

In 1976, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que for malicious prosecution. Que averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City, and Nicolas was indebted to him in any case, and that it was he [Que] who suffered damages due to the unwarranted suit.

Judge Puno held in favor of Nicolas, finding that Que acted maliciously in filing the estafa charge and in alleging that Nicolas issued the dishonored checks with deceit. Que’s MfR was denied. A 2^nd MfR was filed, and Que averred the mere dismissal of the charge in the fiscal's office was not a ground for damages nor did it constitute an actionable wrong. The trial court reversed the original decision, so Que won.

Nicolas contended that the amended decision was null and void for several technical reasons. IAC reinstated the original decision of Judge Puno—so Nicolas won.

QUE NOT GUILTY OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence of malice. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense. [Buchanan v. Esteban]

Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law. Otherwise, there would always be a civil action for damages after the prosecution's failure to prove its cause. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.

Considering that the checks could not be encashed and the supposedly defective goods had not been returned, Que had reason to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him. Que was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his rights. Even if the fiscal found that no deceit was involved and that Que’s claim was unfounded, the mistaken charge was not malicious.

The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action. What was inquired into was WON there was a prima facie showing of estafa. Nowhere in the fiscal's investigation report is there any statement imputing malice to Que.

SC finds Que’s claim of harassment more plausible. However, inasmuch as good faith is presumed, absent sufficient rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice. SC denied both parties their respective claims for damages. Each of them must bear the financial consequences of one’s own acts, including the litigation expenses.

IAC DECISION SET ASIDE; AMENDED DECISION OF TRIAL COURT REINSTATED

Feliciano v. Pasicolan

PABLO FELICIANO v. CFI JUDGE LADISLAO PASICOLAN AND PROVINCIAL FISCAL UNION KAYANAN

1961 / Natividad

Bail > Nature and definition > Definition; persons covered or required to post bail

FACTS

Feliciano, upon learning that an amended information charging him and 17 others of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, went into hiding. Without surrendering himself, he filed a motion through his lawyer in which he asks that the court fix at 10k the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial.

The Provincial Fiscal opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing was premature as Feliciano had not yet been arrested. CFI Judge Pasicolan dismissed Feliciano’s motion on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail."

Feliciano contends that the Constitution provides that “All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.” It is further averred that the phrase "all persons” has been interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense." Therefore, mandamus lies to compel Judge Pasicolan to do so.

ISSUE & HOLDING

WON Feliciano is entitled to admission to bail. NO. Feliciano is a free man; therefore, he is not entitled to admission to bail.

RATIO

Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law.

There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by Feliciano, but it is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.

Herras Teehankee v. Rovira

In order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

Manigbas v. Luna

The right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. 

Guingona v. City Fiscal Flaminiano

TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ANTONIO MARTIN, and TERESITA SANTOS v.
CITY FISCAL FLAMINIANO, ASST. CITY FISCAL LOTA and CLEMENT DAVID

1984 / Makasiar

David invested several deposits with the Nation Savings and Loan Association [NSLA]. He said that he was induced into making said investments by an Australian national who was a close associate of the petitioners [NSLA officials]. On March 1981, NSLA was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, so David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments.

On June 1981, Guingona and Martin, upon David’s request, assumed the bank’s obligation to David by executing a joint promissory note. On July 1981, David received a report that only a portion of his investments was entered in the NSLA records.

On December 1981, David filed I.S. No. 81-31938 in the Office of the City Fiscal, which case was assigned to Asst. City Fiscal Lota for preliminary investigation. David charged petitioners with estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations on foreign exchange transactions.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction because David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil obligation, but the motion was denied. After the presentation of David's principal witness, petitioners filed this petition for prohibition and injunction because:

a.     The production of various documents showed that the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans (civil obligations which were novated when Guingona and Martin assumed them)

b.    David's principal witness testified that the duplicate originals of the instruments of indebtedness were all on file with NSLA.

A TRO was issued ordering the respondents to refrain from proceeding with the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 81-31938.

Petitioners’ liability is civil in nature, so respondents have no jurisdiction over the estafa charge. TRO CORRECTLY ISSUED.

GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.

EXCEPTIONS

1.     For the orderly administration of justice

2.     To prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner

3.     To avoid multiplicity of actions

4.     To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights

5.     In proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid

When David invested his money on time and savings deposits with NSLA, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. The relationship between David and NSLA is that of creditor and debtor. While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has no obligation to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. NSLA’s failure to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.

Considering that petitioners’ liability is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.

Even granting that NSLA’s failure to pay the time and savings deposits would constitute a violation of RPC 315, paragraph 1(b), any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided. When NSLA was placed under receivership, Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation to David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation. The original trust relation between NSLA and David was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and David. While it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. 

Matilde v. Jabson

CRISANTO MATILDE, JR. v. CFI JUDGE RAMON JABSON and PEOPLE

1975 / Antonio

Institution of actions arising from crime > Criminal aspect > Form and content > Substantive > Cause of accusation

FACTS

Three informations were filed against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. and others [laborers at Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises]. They were charged with qualified theft, in relation to PD 133. The items involved were boxes of insecticides belonging to the company.

The informations were amended twice — the first, on the value of the article involved in one case, and the second, on the nature and character of the offense, changing it from "qualified theft" to "simple theft" by deleting the phrase "with grave abuse of confidence". In view of said amendments, Matilde withdrew his previous plea of not guilty. Upon re-arraignment, Matilde pleaded guilty to the crime of simple theft alleged in the three informations. He was convicted in the three cases. Penalty under each case – 6 months & 1 day of prision correccional to 6 years & 1 day of prision mayor.

            Matilde filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that in the absence of any allegation in the information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD 133, he cannot be convicted and penalized under said decree. CFI denied the MfR.

ISSUE & HOLDING

WON CFI can validly impose upon Matilde the penalty prescribed by PD 133. NO

RATIO

Constitution – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

RoC Rule 110, Section 8 – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in an ordinary and concise language so as to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged; and to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.

The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to prepare his defense. He is presumed to be innocent and has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense with which he is charged.

An accused person cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an authorized denial of that right.

The clear import of PD 133 is to eradicate graft and corruption in society and promote the economic and social welfare of the people, by placing a strong deterrent on workers and laborers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, through the imposition of heavier penalties for the theft of any material, spare part, product, or article that he is working on, using or producing. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the information. It is not to be determined from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law allegedly violated, they being conclusions of law.

The informations charge Matilde simply with theft. Nowhere is it alleged that the articles stolen were materials or products which Matilde was "working on or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant. The fact that Matilde is charged with simple theft "in relation to PD 133" is insufficient.

Appropriate penalty: RPC 309 (3). The penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000. Considering the plea of guilty, CFI should have imposed said penalty in its minimum period.