Showing posts with label criminal procedure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal procedure. Show all posts

Monday, September 10, 2012

Feliciano v. Pasicolan


PABLO FELICIANO v. CFI JUDGE LADISLAO PASICOLAN AND PROVINCIAL FISCAL UNION KAYANAN
1961 / Natividad
Bail > Nature and definition > Definition; persons covered or required to post bail

FACTS
Feliciano, upon learning that an amended information charging him and 17 others of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, went into hiding. Without surrendering himself, he filed a motion through his lawyer in which he asks that the court fix at 10k the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial.
The Provincial Fiscal opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing was premature as Feliciano had not yet been arrested. CFI Judge Pasicolan dismissed Feliciano’s motion on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail."
Feliciano contends that the Constitution provides that “All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.” It is further averred that the phrase "all persons” has been interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense." Therefore, mandamus lies to compel Judge Pasicolan to do so.

ISSUE & HOLDING
WON Feliciano is entitled to admission to bail. NO. Feliciano is a free man; therefore, he is not entitled to admission to bail.

RATIO
Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law.
There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by Feliciano, but it is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.

Herras Teehankee v. Rovira
In order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

Manigbas v. Luna
The right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. 

Guingona v. City Fiscal Flaminiano


TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ANTONIO MARTIN, and TERESITA SANTOS v.
CITY FISCAL FLAMINIANO, ASST. CITY FISCAL LOTA and CLEMENT DAVID
1984 / Makasiar

David invested several deposits with the Nation Savings and Loan Association [NSLA]. He said that he was induced into making said investments by an Australian national who was a close associate of the petitioners [NSLA officials]. On March 1981, NSLA was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, so David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments.
On June 1981, Guingona and Martin, upon David’s request, assumed the bank’s obligation to David by executing a joint promissory note. On July 1981, David received a report that only a portion of his investments was entered in the NSLA records.
On December 1981, David filed I.S. No. 81-31938 in the Office of the City Fiscal, which case was assigned to Asst. City Fiscal Lota for preliminary investigation. David charged petitioners with estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations on foreign exchange transactions.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction because David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil obligation, but the motion was denied. After the presentation of David's principal witness, petitioners filed this petition for prohibition and injunction because:
a.     The production of various documents showed that the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans (civil obligations which were novated when Guingona and Martin assumed them)
b.    David's principal witness testified that the duplicate originals of the instruments of indebtedness were all on file with NSLA.
A TRO was issued ordering the respondents to refrain from proceeding with the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 81-31938.

Petitioners’ liability is civil in nature, so respondents have no jurisdiction over the estafa charge. TRO CORRECTLY ISSUED.

GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.
EXCEPTIONS
1.     For the orderly administration of justice
2.     To prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner
3.     To avoid multiplicity of actions
4.     To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights
5.     In proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid

When David invested his money on time and savings deposits with NSLA, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. The relationship between David and NSLA is that of creditor and debtor. While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has no obligation to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. NSLA’s failure to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.
Considering that petitioners’ liability is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.
Even granting that NSLA’s failure to pay the time and savings deposits would constitute a violation of RPC 315, paragraph 1(b), any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided. When NSLA was placed under receivership, Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation to David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation. The original trust relation between NSLA and David was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and David. While it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. 

Matilde v. Jabson


CRISANTO MATILDE, JR. v. CFI JUDGE RAMON JABSON and PEOPLE
1975 / Antonio
Institution of actions arising from crime > Criminal aspect > Form and content > Substantive > Cause of accusation

FACTS
Three informations were filed against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. and others [laborers at Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises]. They were charged with qualified theft, in relation to PD 133. The items involved were boxes of insecticides belonging to the company.
The informations were amended twice — the first, on the value of the article involved in one case, and the second, on the nature and character of the offense, changing it from "qualified theft" to "simple theft" by deleting the phrase "with grave abuse of confidence". In view of said amendments, Matilde withdrew his previous plea of not guilty. Upon re-arraignment, Matilde pleaded guilty to the crime of simple theft alleged in the three informations. He was convicted in the three cases. Penalty under each case – 6 months & 1 day of prision correccional to 6 years & 1 day of prision mayor.
            Matilde filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that in the absence of any allegation in the information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD 133, he cannot be convicted and penalized under said decree. CFI denied the MfR.

ISSUE & HOLDING
WON CFI can validly impose upon Matilde the penalty prescribed by PD 133. NO

RATIO
Constitution – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

RoC Rule 110, Section 8 – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in an ordinary and concise language so as to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged; and to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.

The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to prepare his defense. He is presumed to be innocent and has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense with which he is charged.
An accused person cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an authorized denial of that right.
The clear import of PD 133 is to eradicate graft and corruption in society and promote the economic and social welfare of the people, by placing a strong deterrent on workers and laborers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, through the imposition of heavier penalties for the theft of any material, spare part, product, or article that he is working on, using or producing. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the information. It is not to be determined from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law allegedly violated, they being conclusions of law.
The informations charge Matilde simply with theft. Nowhere is it alleged that the articles stolen were materials or products which Matilde was "working on or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant. The fact that Matilde is charged with simple theft "in relation to PD 133" is insufficient.

Appropriate penalty: RPC 309 (3). The penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000. Considering the plea of guilty, CFI should have imposed said penalty in its minimum period. 

Sunday, July 8, 2012

People v. Doria


People v. Florencio Doria [“ Jun ”] and Violeta Gaddao [ “Neneth ” ]
22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless search and seizure >  Plain view  doctrine

FACTS
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
            The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
            Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.

ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO

RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
            Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

 Plain view  issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. 

Requisites
  1. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
  2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
  3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.  The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container.  Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.  If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana."  Each of the ten  bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana.  He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.  It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
  • Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
  • Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug

DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED

People v. Umanito


People v. Rufino Umanito
26 Oct 2007 / Tinga / Appeal from a CA decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > With a search warrant > Things that may be seized > Rules on DNA evidence [AM No. 06-11-5-SC (2007)]

FACTS
Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a young male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He waited for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her into the Home Economics Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed her while still holding the knife. He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA ’ s mother noticed the prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station. (Umanito’ s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that she had a crush on him since she frequently visited him.)
            RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito ’s appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review (as per Mateo ruling), and CA affirmed RTC. Umanito seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA ’ s questionable credibility as grounds. He also said that AAA filed the complaint only upon her mother ’s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with another (a married man). Also, he claimed that there were several inconsistencies in her assertions.

CASE IS REMANDED TO THE RTC FOR RECEPTION OF DNA EVIDENCE

RATIO
The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito ’ s absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).
            DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could be resorted to.
            The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SCthe courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine the institution to undertake the testing, and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.
            To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.