Dumlao v. COMELEC

DUMLAO, IGOT, SALAPANTAN, JR. v. COMELEC

22 January 1980 | Melencio-Herrera

Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order

Petitioners

Dumlao – former Nueva Vizcaya governor who filed a CoC for the position of Governor in the forthcoming elections (30 Jan 1980)

Igot – taxpayer, qualified voter, member of the Bar

Salapantan – taxpayer, qualified voter

Points of contention

Dumlao questions the constitutionality of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 1 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process clauses

Dumlao also alleges that such provision is directed against him and that the classification is based on purely arbitrary grounds (class legislation)

• Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired

As for Igot and Salapantan, they assail the validity of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2

• Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State […] shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act […] provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Resolution

The procedural aspect

Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities so it is traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution

• Misjoinder of parties and actions (interest of Dumlao alien to that of Igot and Salapantan; they contest different provisions; nature of joining suit different)
• Out of the four requisites for the exercise of judicial review (SALE – standing, actual case, lis mota, earliest opportunity), only the requisite of raising the issue at the earliest opportunity was complied with

Actual case and controversy

• Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of provision as there is no petition has been filed seeking his disqualification
• In effect, his petition is one seeking an advisory opinion
• His case is within COMELEC’s primary jurisdiction (sole judge of contests relating to qualifications…)

Proper party

• It was only during the hearing (not in their petition) that Igot is said to be a Councilor candidate
• Neither Igot nor Salapantan has been convicted / charged with acts of disloyalty, and they have not been disqualified from being candidates (generated grievance only)
• As regards the petition being a taxpayer’s suit
• Statutory provisions do not directly involve public fund disbursement
• The two did not allege that their tax money is being misappropriated
• Neither do they seek to restraint COMELEC from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid law
• Institution of taxpayer’s suit is no assurance of judicial review

Unavoidability of constitutional question

• This case is not an appropriate case for either of the petitioners because there is no cause of action; hence, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent

The substantive viewpoint

THEY HAVE RESOLVED TO RULE ON TWO OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS THOUGH

• Paramount public interest involved
• Proximity of the elections (case decided 22 Jan; elections on 30 Jan)

Regarding Dumlao’s contentions

Dumlao’s contention that the provision is against him personally is BELIED by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates have been filed with the COMELEC

Equal protection is subject to rational classification

• Employees 65 y/o (they are subject to compulsory retirement) have been classified differently from the younger ones (for purposes of public service)
• Reason to disqualify from same office: retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable from the same gov’t work but by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume same post
• Purpose of the law: to allow emergence of younger blood in local gov’t

Absent is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision

It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for candidates provided they are reasonable

Regarding Igot and Salapantan’s contentions

Accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; accusation ≠ guilt

Challenged provision (BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2) contravenes constitutional presumption of innocence because candidate is disqualified on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him

• He is placed in the same category as a person ALREADY CONVICTED of a crime

Although the filing of charges is just prima facie evidence (can be rebutted by contrary proof), there is “clear and present danger” considering that elections was just 8 days away (no more time to offer proof to overcome prima facie evidence)

It is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body (like COMELEC)

Legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination

Disposition

BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 1 VALID à This is the provision challenged by Dumlao

Portion of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2 declared NULL AND VOID for being violative of presumption of innocence à This is the provision challenged by Igot and Salapantan

“…the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact"

Opinions

Concurring: Barredo

Sec. 9(1), Art. XII-C [Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination] is more expensive than the equal protection clause

Concurring: Aquino

BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2 is VALID, being similar to certain presumptions in RPC 217, 315 as amended by RA 4885

Concurring: Abad Santos

A judgment of conviction (as provided in BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2) should be one which is final and appealable

Concurring: Fernando

Provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause

Dissenting: Teehankee

Dissents insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of BP 52, Sec. 4 (special disqualification

Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated (a retired officer running for another position is allowed to run)

Mentioned purpose (infusing new blood in local gov’t) is not rational nor reasonable

Disqualification / non-disqualification and consequent classification as old / new blood cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of WON they have received retirement benefits

Disqualification violative of equal protection clause as well as Sec. 9(1), Art. XII-C (see Barredo’s concurring opinion)