LAURA
VELASCO and GRETA ACOSTA v. JUDGE SERGIO APOSTOL and MAHARLIKA INSURANCE
1989 / Regalado
FACTS
On 27 Nov
1973, around 230 PM, Laura Velasco
and Greta Acosta were riding in Velasco’s
Mercury car when an N/S
taxicab driven by Dominador Santos [registered in the name of Alice Artuz,
c/o Norberto Santos] crossed the center island towards their direction, and collided with their car at the left
front part. The taxicab tried to return to its original lane, but was unable to
climb the island. It backtracked, hitting again Velasco’s car
in the left near portion, causing the latter's back portion to turn toward the
center hitting a jeepney on its right, which was travelling along their side.
Velasco
and Acosta sued the taxicab driver and its registered owners, claiming actual,
moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. Maharlika Insurance was impleaded as a defendant in an amended
complaint, with an allegation that
the N/S taxicab was insured against
third party liability for 20k with Maharlika at the time of the
accident.
Maharlika claimed that there was no cause of action against it
because at the time of the accident, the
alleged insurance policy was not in force due to non-payment of the premium.
It further averred that even if the taxicab had been insured, the complaint would still be premature
since the policy provides that the
insurer would be liable only when the insured becomes legally liable.
RTC ruled in favor of Velasco and Acosta,
finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the taxicab driver’s
negligence. However, Maharlika was
exonerated on the ground that the policy was not in force for failure to pay the initial premium and for
their concealment of a material fact.
The payment was accepted by Maharlika
without any knowledge that the risk insured against had already occurred
since such fact was concealed by the insured and was not revealed to Maharlika.
The accident occurred on 27 Nov 1973 while the initial premium was
paid only on 11 Dec 1973. Velasco
and Acosta maintain that in spite of
this late payment, the policy is
binding because there was an implied
agreement to grant a credit extension so as to make the policy effective.
To them, the subsequent acceptance of the premium and delivery of the policy estops Maharlika from asserting that
the policy is ineffective.
ISSUE
& HOLDING
WON Maharlika Insurance is liable. NOT LIABLE. RTC JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
RATIO
It should be noted that this controversy arose
under the aegis of the old insurance law, Act
No. 2427, as amended. The former insurance law, which applies to this case,
provided that:
An insurer is entitled to the payment of premium
as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against, unless
there is clear agreement to grant the insured credit extension of the premium
due. No policy issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and
until the premium thereof has been paid.
The insurance policy in
question would be valid and binding notwithstanding the non-payment of the
premium if there was a clear agreement to grant to the insured credit
extension. Such agreement may be express or implied.
SC finds no cogent proof of any such implied agreement. Had there really been a credit extension,
the insured would not have had any apprehension or hesitation to inform Maharlika
at the time of or before the payment of the premium that an accident for which
the insurer may be held liable had already happened. Under such
circumstances, notice alone is necessary and the insured need not pay the
premium because whatever premium may have been due may already be deducted upon
the satisfaction of the loss under the policy. Velasco and Acosta failed to
point out any other circumstances showing that prepayment of premium was not
intended to be insisted upon. They have thus failed to discharge the burden of
proving their allegation of the existence of the purported credit extension
agreement.
SC
noted that in the present law, Section 77 of the Insurance Code of 1978 has
deleted the clause "unless there is clear agreement to grant the insured
credit extension of the premium due" which was involved in this
controversy.
The fact withheld could not
have influenced Maharlika in entering into the supposed contract or in
estimating the character of the risk or in fixing the rate premium, because no such contract existed at the time of the
accident. There was nothing to rescind at that point in time. What should
be apparent from such actuations of the taxicab owner/s is the presence of bad faith on their part, a
reprehensible disregard of the principle that insurance contracts are uberrimae fidae and demand the most
abundant good faith.
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