Showing posts with label proximate cause. Show all posts
Showing posts with label proximate cause. Show all posts

Monday, July 30, 2012

Pilipinas Bank v. CA


PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES
1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision
The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui (11k~) as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of the checks, Reyes requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit.
In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account number to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” so that was the number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with the name “Florencio,” Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was for Florencio Amador, so he posted the deposit in the account of Amador.
The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his account only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later but it was dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s favor. Tui returned the check to Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.
Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in Amador’s account was transferred to Reyes’ account upon being cleared by the former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then honored the check.
RTC ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay damages to Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASI’S NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES’ CASH DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME
  • For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
  • Proximate cause – any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.
Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties
  • He posted the cash deposit in Amador’s account from the assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip
  • He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by Reyes were dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance

Mercury Drug v. Baking


MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution
The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that was what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.
On the 3rd day of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided with Josie Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.
Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM
To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

  • Damage suffered by plaintiff
  • Fault or negligence of defendant
  • Connection of cause and effect between A & B
The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
            Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy.

MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180
It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE

  • Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise; determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent
  • Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision
AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages

Sunday, July 22, 2012

PLDT v. CA


PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban
1989 / Regalado / Petition for review on certiorari of CA resolution
Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiff's negligence is proximate cause

FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep's windshield was also shattered.
          PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.
          RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses' complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTC's decision. (SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times
          The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife's injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
          The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT. 
          A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

Monday, July 2, 2012

Consolidated Bank v. CA


Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA + L.C. Diaz and Company (2003) / Carpio

Facts
LC Diaz [professional partnership engaged in accounting] opened a savings account with Solidbank. LC Diaz's cashier, Macaraya, filled up two savings deposit slips, and she gave them + passbook to messenger Calapre and instructed him to deposit the money with Solidbank. Calapre presented the deposit slips and passbook to the teller. He left the passbook with Solidbank first as he had to make another deposit at Allied Bank, but when he returned, he was informed that somebody got the passbook. Calapre reported this to Macaraya. Macaraya + Calapre went back to Solidbank with a deposit slip [P200k check]. When Macaraya asked about the passbook, the teller said that someone shorter than Calapre got it. Macaraya reported this matter. 
     The following day, CEO Diaz called Solidbank to stop any transaction using the passbook until the company could open a new account. It was found out that learned that P300k was withdrawn from the account the previous day. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of two authorized signatories of LC Diaz but they denied signing it. Noel Tamayo received this sum of money.
     An information for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola (first time they appeared in the case discussion), but the RTC dismissed the criminal case. LC Diaz demanded the return of their money from Solidbank, but the latter refused and a complaint for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them. However, Solidbank was absolved.
    RTC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook ["Possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally."] RTC said that the burden of proof shifted to LC Diaz to prove that the signatures are not forged. Also, they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed to be the owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such, their act of allowing the withdrawal was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence. As regards the contention that LC Diaz and Solidbank had precautionary procedures (like a secret handshake of sorts) whenever the former withdrew a large sum, RTC pointed out that LC Diaz disregarded this in the past withdrawal.
     CA, on the other hand, said that the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal is Solidbank's negligence, applying NCC 2176. CA said the 3 elements of QD are present [damages; fault or negligence; connection of cause and effect]. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. Proximate cause is teller's failure to call LC Diaz. CA ruled that while LC Diaz was negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.” Solidbank could have averted the injury had it called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal.

RATIO
On Solidbank's fiduciary duty under the law
SC says that Solidbank is liable for breach of K due to negligence [culpa contractual]. K [savings deposit agreement] between bank and depositor governed by provisions on simple loan; bank is the debtor and depositor is the creditor. Banks are under obligation to treat accounts of depositors with meticulous care [higher than diligence of a good father of a family standard], bearing in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The bank's obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written in every deposit agreement. However, this nature does not convert K from a simple loan to a trust agreement (failure by bank to pay depositor is failure to pay a simple loan only).

Solidbank's breach of K-tual obligation
For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes an even higher degree of diligence. Likewise, tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or authorized representative.
     In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Solidbank failed to discharge this burden, after LC Diaz establishing the breach of K-tual obligation. Hence, Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees. The defense of exercising required diligence in selecting, supervising employees is NOT a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.

Proximate cause of unauthorized withdrawal
Solidbank’s negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre was the proximate cause. [Definition: cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.]
     RTC said that LC Diaz’ negligence was the proximate cause. However, SC says LC Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. In fact, it was in the possession of the bank while the deposit was being processed. CA said that teller's failure to call LC Diaz was the proximate cause. SC says the bank did not have the duty to call LC Diaz to confirm withdrawal.

Doctrine of last clear chance
"Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss."
     SC DOES NOT APPLY IT HERE. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to LC Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Since LC Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence, Solidbank's liability should be reduced.