Pilipinas Bank v. CA

PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES

1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision

The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui (11k~) as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of the checks, Reyes requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit.

In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account number to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” so that was the number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with the name “Florencio,” Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was for Florencio Amador, so he posted the deposit in the account of Amador.

The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his account only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later but it was dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s favor. Tui returned the check to Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.

Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in Amador’s account was transferred to Reyes’ account upon being cleared by the former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then honored the check.

RTC ordered Pilipinas Bank to pay damages to Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASI’S NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES’ CASH DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME

• For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
• Proximate cause – any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.

Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties

• He posted the cash deposit in Amador’s account from the assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip
• He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by Reyes were dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance

Mercury Drug v. Baking

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING

2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution

The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that was what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.

On the 3^rd day of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided with Josie Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.

Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM

To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

• Damage suffered by plaintiff
• Fault or negligence of defendant
• Connection of cause and effect between A & B

The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

            Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy.

MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180

It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE

• Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise; determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent
• Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision

AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages

Nikko Hotel v. Reyes

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM v. ROBERTO REYES

2005 / Chico-Nazario / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution

Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiff’s assumption of risk / volenti non fit injuria

Cause of action was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of NCC.

Roberto Reyes[1] said he was spotted by his friend Dr. Violeta Filart in the hotel lobby who approached him. She invited him to join her in the GM’s birthday party at the penthouse. He carried Filart’s present—a basket of fruits. When dinner was ready, Reyes lined up at the table but to his embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim (Hotel Executive Secretary). In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of other guests, Lim told him to leave—huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, but the latter ignored him. He was escorted out by a police officer.

                Ruby Lim said she was the hotel’s executive secretary for 20 years, and that she was tasked to organize the GM’s birthday party. Mindful of the GM’s request to keep the party intimate, she requested 2 people to tell Reyes to leave, but Reyes still lingered. She had the chance to talk to Reyes when he was starting to eat, so she told him, Alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo. Reyes made a scene by screaming and he threatened to dump food on her.

                Dr. Filart said Reyes volunteered to carry the basket of fruits as he was going to the elevator as well. When they reached the penthouse, she told him to go down as he was not invited. She thought Reyes already left but she saw him at the bar. When there was a commotion, she saw Reyes shouting, and she ignored him, as she did not want the GM to think that she invited him.

                Reyes claimed damages (1M actual damages, 1M moral and/or exemplary damages, 200k attorney’s fees). RTC dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to Lim’s testimony. RTC also said that Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was not invited. CA reversed RTC, believing Reyes’ version of the facts.    Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that they cannot be made liable for damages under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria as Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”

DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THIS CASE

• Volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury)—Self-inflicted injury or consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so
• Even if Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. [NCC 19, 21]

SC FINDS RTC’S FINDINGS OF FACT MORE CREDIBLE—Lim did not abuse her right to ask Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly

• Lim, mindful of GM’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of Reyes in the most hush-hush manner so as not to call attention
• Reyes was not able to explain why Lim would make a scene; Reyes admitted that when Lim talked to him, she was so close enough for him to kiss à unlikely that she would shout at him at such a close distance (SC also noted the fact that she has been in the hotel business long enough as to imbibe virtues of politeness and discreteness)
• Reyes was not able to present witnesses to back up his story; all his witnesses proved only that Filart invited him to the party

LIM AND HOTEL NIKKO NOT LIABLE TO PAY FOR DAMAGES UNDER NCC 19 AND 21

• NCC 19 (principle of abuse of rights) is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances; NCC 19’s object is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties; its elements are the following:
• Legal right or duty
• Exercised in bad faith
• For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
• NCC 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
• There is an act which is legal
• But it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, public policy
• And it is done with intent to injure
• Common theme running through NCC 19 and 21–act must be INTENTIONAL
• Reyes has not shown that Lim was driven by animosity against him; he had a lame argument: Lim, being single at 44, had a very strong bias and prejudice against him possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen
• Manner by which Lim asked Reyes to leave was acceptable and humane

Any damage which Reyes might have suffered through Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith must be his to bear alone.

---

[1] Actor of long standing; co-host of radio program; board member of Music Singer Composer chaired by Imelda Papin; showbiz coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; 1992 official candidate for Bohol governor

Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance

QUA CHEE GAN v. LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE

1955 / JBL Reyes / Appeal from CFI judgment

Qua Chee Gan owned 4 warehouses or bodegas used for the storage of copra and hemp, which were insured with Law Union, and the lose made payable to PNB as mortgage of the hemp and copra. Fire broke out and destroyed bodegas 1, 3 ad 4. QCG informed LU by telegram, and the next day, fire adjusters arrived to conduct an investigation. LU resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by QCG or by other persons in connivance with him.

            QCG, his brother, and some employees were indicted and tried for arson, but they were acquitted. Thereafter, the civil suit to collect the insurance money proceeded to its trial. CFI rendered a decision in QCG’s favor.

CFI AFFIRMED; LAW UNION LIABLE

On false and fraudulent claims

CFI found that the discrepancies were a result of QCG’s erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the insurance policies and claim forms, caused by his imperfect English, and that the misstatements were innocently made and without intent to defraud. The rule is that to avoid a policy, the false swearing must be willful and with intent to defraud which was not the cause.

On the storage of gasoline

Ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them. This rigid application of the rule has become necessary in view of current business practices. In contrast to contracts entered into by parties bargaining on an equal footing, a contract of insurance calls for greater strictness and vigilance on the part of courts of justice with a view to protect the weaker party from abuses and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the unwary. The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uferrimal fidei) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility.

            QCG admitted that there were 36 cans of gasoline in Bodega 2. Gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the prohibited articles listed in the hemp warranty. The cause relied upon LU speaks of oils. In ordinary parlance, “oils” means “lubricants” and not gasoline or kerosene. The prohibition of keeping gasoline could have been expressed clearly and unmistakably.

On fire hydrants warranty

LU is estopped from claiming that there was a violation of such warranty, since it knew that from the start, the number of hydrants it demanded never existed, yet it issued policies and received premiums.

vda. de Canilang v. CA

THELMA vda. de CANILANG v. CA and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE

1993 / Feliciano / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision

On June 1982, Jaime Canilang was diagnosed as suffering from sinus tachycardia. Two months later, he was found to have acute bronchitis. The next day, he applied for a “non-medical” insurance policy with Great Pacific and named his wife Thelma as his beneficiary. A year later, he died of congestive heart failure, anemia, and chronic anemia. When Thelma filed a claim with Great Pacific, it was denied on the ground that Jaime concealed material information.

            Thelma filed a complaint against Great Pacific with the Insurance Commission for recovery of the insurance proceeds. She testified that she was not aware of any serious illness suffered by Jaime, and that what she knew was that he died because of a kidney disorder. Great Pacific presented a physician who explained that Jaime’s application had been approved based on his medical declaration, and that medical examinations are required only in cases where applicant indicated that he has undergone medical consultation and hospitalization.

The Insurance Commission held that there was no intentional concealment on Jaime’s part. It also held that Great Pacific waived its right to inquire into Jaime’s health condition by issuing the policy despite the lack of answers to some of the pertinent questions in the application. It said BP 874, which voids an insurance contract WON concealment was made intentionally, was not applicable since the law became effective only on 1985.

CA reversed IC. CA said that the issue is WON there was material concealment, and not WON Canilang ‘intentionally’ made material concealment. It held that Jaime’s failure to disclose previous medical consultation and treatment constituted material information.

CANILANG FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION

The applicable law at that time was PD 1460 (Insurance Code of 1978). Under said law, the information concealed must be such which the concealing party knew and ought to have communicated—those which are material to the contract. The test of materiality is determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries.

Canilang failed to disclose material information when he did not indicate under the caption ‘Exceptions’ that he twice consulted a doctor who found him to be suffering from sinus tachycardia and acute bronchitis. This failure to communicate must have been intentional, since Jaime could have been aware that his heartbeat would rise to high levels and that he consulted a doctor twice before applying for insurance.

The preceding statute, Act 2427, provided that a concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entitles the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance. However, in PD 1460, this phrase was not present. [The current law, BP 874, has the phrase.] SC rejected the IC’s unspoken theory that the deletion of the phrase intended to limit the kinds of concealment to intentional concealments. The provision is properly read as referring to ANY concealment [“intentional” and “unintentional” cancel each other out].

CA AFFIRMED; PETITION DENIED

Fieldmen's Insurance v. vda. de Songco

FIELDMEN’S INSURANCE v. MERCEDES VARGAS vda. DE SONGCO, et al. and CA

1968 / Fernando / Review of CA decision

Federico Songco, a man of scant education [first grader], owned a private jeepney. He was induced by Fieldmen’s Insurance agent Benjamin Sambat to apply for a Common Carrier’s Liability Insurance Policy covering his motor vehicle. [As testified by Songco’s son Amor later,] Federico said that his vehicle is an ‘owner’ private vehicle and not for passengers, but agent Sambat said that they can insure whatever kind of vehicle because their company is not owned by the government, so they could do what they please whenever they believe a vehicle is insurable. Songco paid an annual premium and he was issued a Common Carriers Accident Insurance Policy. After the policy expired, he renewed the policy. During the effectivity of the renewed policy, the insured vehicle while being driven by Rodolfo Songco [duly licensed driver and Federico’s son] collided with a car. As a result, Federico and Rodolfo died, while Carlos (another son) and his wife Angelita, and a family friend sustained physical injuries.

            The lower court held that Fieldmen’s Insurance cannot escape liability under a common carrier insurance policy on the pretext that what was insured was a private vehicle and not a common carrier, the policy being issued upon the agent’s insistence. CA affirmed the lower court.

CA DECISION AFFIRMED; FIELDMEN’S INSURANCE IS LIABLE

From Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance – Where inequitable conduct is shown by an insurance firm, it is estopped from enforcing forfeitures in its favor, in order to forestall fraud or imposition on the insured. Estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall the innocent party due to its injurious reliance.

Fieldmen’s Insurance incurred legal liability under the policy. Since some of the conditions in the policy were impossible to comply with under the existing conditions at the time and inconsistent with the known facts, the insurer is estopped from asserting breach of such conditions. Except for the fact that the passengers were not fare-paying, their status as beneficiaries under the policy is recognized. Even if the be assumed that there was an ambiguity, such must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them.

The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uberrima fides) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility.

Sunlife Assurance v. CA

SUNLIFE ASSURANCE v. CA and SPS. ROLANDO and BERNARDA BACANI

1995 / Quiason / Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision

FACTS

On April 1986, Robert John Bacani procured for himself a life insurance contract from Sunlife. He was issued a policy valued at 100k with double indemnity in case of accidental death, and his beneficiary was his mother, Bernarda. On June 1987, Robert died in a plane crash.

Bernarda filed a claim with Sunlife, seeking the benefits of her son’s insurance policy. The findings of the investigation conducted by Sunlife prompted it to reject the claim. Sunlife informed Bernarda that Robert did not disclose material facts relevant to the policy issuance, thus rendering the contract voidable. Sunlife claimed that Robert gave false statements in his application when he answered questions regarding consulting doctors [re: urine, kidney, bladder disorder], submitting to medical exams, and being admitted to a hospital within the past 5 years. Robert only said that he consulted a doctor for cough and flu complications. Sunlife discovered that 2 weeks prior to Robert’s application for insurance, he was examined and confined at the Lung Center where he was diagnosed for renal failure. A check representing the premiums paid was attached to the letter.

Sps. Bacani filed an action for specific performance against Sunlife. RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Bacani, saying that the facts concealed by Robert were made in good faith and under a belief that they need not be disclosed. It also held that Robert’s health history was immaterial since the insurance policy was “non-medical.” CA affirmed RTC.

SUNLIFE PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BY REASON OF ROBERT’S CONCEALMENT

RATIO

“Good faith” is no defense in concealment. Materiality is to be determined solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making his inquiries. Materiality does not depend on the insured’s state of mind, nor does it depend on the actual or physical events that ensue.

            The matters concealed would have affected Sunlife’s action on Robert’s application, as it would have approved it with the corresponding adjustment for a higher premium or it would have rejected it. A disclosure may have warranted a medical examination by Sunlife in order for it to assess the risk involved in accepting the application. In addition, Robert’s failure to disclose his hospitalization raises grave doubts about his good faith.

The argument that Sunlife’s waiver of the medical examination debunks the materiality of the facts concealed is untenable. The waiver of a medical examination [in a non-medical insurance contract] renders even more material the information required of the applicant, for such information constitutes an important factor which the insurer takes into consideration in deciding WON to issue the policy. Moreover, this argument by Sps. Bacani would make ineffective the provision that allows rescission where there is concealment.

The insured need not die of the disease he had failed to disclose. It is sufficient that his non-disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks of the proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries.

CA DECISION REVERSED; SUNLIFE’S PETITION GRANTED

Yu Pang Cheng v. CA

YU PANG CHENG v. CA

1959 / Bautista Angelo / Petition for review by certiorari of a CA decision

FACTS

On September 1950, Yu Pang Eng submitted his application for insurance to an insurance company [defendant]. He answered “no” to questions on his medical history (stomach diseases, dizziness, ulcers, vertigo, cancer, tumors, etc.) as well as to the question of WON he consulted any physician regarding said diseases. Upon payment of the first premium, the company issued to him an insurance policy. On December 1950, he went to St. Luke’s for medical treatment but he died two months later. According to the death certificate, he died of infiltrating medullary carcinoma, Grade 4, advanced cardiac and of lesser curvature, stomach metastases spleen.

His brother and beneficiary, Yu Pang Cheng [petitioner], demanded from the insurance company the payment of the policy proceeds [10k], but his demand was refused so he brought the present action. The insurance company’s defense was that the insured was guilty of misrepresentation and concealment of material facts in that he gave false and untruthful answers to questions asked him in his application; hence, the effect is the avoiding of the policy.

It appears that the insured entered the Chinese General Hospital for medical treatment on January 1950 [before application for insurance policy], complaining of dizziness, anemia, abdominal pains and tarry stools. His illness history shows that this started a year ago as frequent dizziness. An x-ray picture of his stomach and the diagnosis was that he suffered from peptic ulcer, bleeding.

INSURED IS GUILTY OF CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Concealment is a neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate. Whether intentional or not, concealment entitles the insurer to rescind the contract. The law requires the insured to communicate to the insurer all facts within his knowledge which are material to the contract and which the other party has not the means of ascertaining. The materiality is determined not by the event but by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due.

The insured’s negative answers to the questions on his previous ailments, or his concealment of his hospitalization deprived the insurance company of the opportunity to make the necessary inquiry as to the nature of his past illness so that it may form its estimate relative to the approval of his application. Had the insurance company been given such opportunity, it would not probably consent to the policy issuance.

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan

National Power Corporation [NPC] v. Heirs of Noble Casionan [Parents of Noble]

2008 / R.T. Reyes / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision

Defenses against charge of negligence > Contributory negligence of plaintiff

FACTS

In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducing their distance from the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles, and they identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.

     19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead as they passed through the trail underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him, but Noble was already dead.

          A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer determined the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to electrocution. There was a small burned area in the middle right finger of Noble.

     Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see any danger warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs around the area.

     Noble's parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made to increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.

     RTC decided in favor of Noble's parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification--award of moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the decision.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble. NO; hence, NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.

RATIO

Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate causeof the injury.

     The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured party's contributory negligence.

Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand

In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. In this case, there were no warning signs, and the trail was regularly used by people since it was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

     NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by DENR in the area. In Añonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission lines dangling.

Damages awarded

• Noble's unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses)]
• Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence]
• Moral damages of 50k

PLDT v. CA

PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban

1989 / Regalado / Petition for review on certiorari of CA resolution

Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiff's negligence is proximate cause

FACTS

Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep's windshield was also shattered.

          PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.

          RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses' complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTC's decision. (SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

RATIO

The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times. 

          The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife's injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.

          The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT. 

          A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

Cantre v. Sps. Go

Dr. Milagros Cantre v. Sps. John David and Nora Go

2007 / Quisumbing / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution

FACTS

Nora Go gave birth to her 4th child. Two hours later, she suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some placenta parts which were not completely expelled after delivery. She then suffered hypovolemic shock, so her BP dropped to 40/0. Dr. Milagros Cantre, an Ob-Gyne specialist and Nora's attending physician, together with an assisting resident physician, performed various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora's BP. While Dr. Cantre was massaging Nora's uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. At that time, she was unconscious.

     While in the recovery room, Nora's husband John David noticed a fresh gaping wound (2 1/2 x 3 1/2 in) in the inner portion of her left arm near the armpit. When he asked the nurses about the cause of the injury, he was informed that it was due to a burn. John David filed a request for investigation. Dr. Cantre said that what caused the injury was the blood pressure cuff. John David brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination. The medico-legal said that the injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn. He dismissed the likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood pressure cuff since the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the arm. Nora's injury was referred to a plastic surgeon for skin grafting. However, her arm would never be the same--the surgery left an unsightly scar, her movements are restricted, and the injured arm aches at the slightest touch.

     Sps. Go filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Cantre, the medical director, and the hospital. In the RTC, parties have rested their respective cases, but the court admitted additional exhibits [consist mostly of medical records produced by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum] offered by Sps. Go, which were not testified to by any witness. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA affirmed RTC with modification (complaint dismissed with respect to the medical director and the hospital; only moral damages awarded).

ISSUES AND HOLDING

1. WON the questioned additional exhibits are admissible in evidence. YES
2. WON Dr. Cantre is liable for the injury suffered by Nora Go. YES

RATIO

Preliminary discussion

Dr. Cantre's counsel admitted the existence of the additional exhibits when they were formally offered for admission by the RTC. In any case, given the circumstances of this case, a ruling on Dr. Cantre's negligence may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the absence of the additional exhibits.

Backgrounder

The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to their patients' well-being, and if a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of care, and they never set out to intentionally  cause injury to their patients. HOWEVER, intent is immaterial in these cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.

Res ipsa loquitur x Medical negligence cases

In medical negligence cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:

1. Accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur absent someone's negligence
   • Wound not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby; could not have happened unless negligence set in somewhere
2. Caused by an instrumentality within defendant's exclusive control
   • It doesn't matter WON the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff, since both are within the exclusive control of the physician in charge [Dr. Cantre] under the captain of the ship doctrine [surgeon in charge of an operation is held liable for his assistants' negligence during the time when they are under the surgeon's control].
3. Possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible is eliminated
   • Wound could only be caused by something external to and outside the control of Nora since she was unconscious while in hypervolemic shock.

On Dr. Cantre's other arguments + what would have been her saving grace

• BP cuff defense does not afford her an escape. The medical practice is to deflate the cuff immediately after use, or else, it could cause an injury similar to what happened to Nora. If the wound was caused by the constant taking of BP, it must have been done so negligently as to inflict a gaping wound.
• The argument that the failed plastic surgery was a measure to prevent complication (and not intended as a cosmetic procedure) does not negate negligence on Dr. Cantre's part.
• Dr. Cantre has been Nora's ob-gyne for her past 3 deliveries, and this is the first time that Dr. Cantre is being held liable for damages due to negligence in the practice of her profession. She promptly took care of the wound before infection set in. Since Nora was in a critical condition at that time, saving her life became Dr. Cantre's elemental concern. Still, her good intentions characteristics do not justify negligence. 

NCC provisions applied

• NCC 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. [...]
• NCC 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. [200k moral damages awarded]

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana

Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes

Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions

Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals

FACTS

Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: "sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure" (two pieces of gauze were missing). A "diligent search" was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.

          A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.

          Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad's body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil's negligence. YES

RATIO

DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE

His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes' alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in order].

          Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient's abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. What's worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldn't have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

• Duty - to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
• Breach - failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
• Injury - suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
• Proximate Causation - breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient's vagina

DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE

The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas' does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant [DR. FUENTES] -- LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant

Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:

• He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
• He examined Dr. Fuentes' work and found it in order
• He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
• He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]

Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court's bases for sustaining PSI's liability:

• Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship
• • For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control]
• Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel
• • Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
  • PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.
  • • If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents' acts.
• Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility
• • This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital's liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of respondeat superior.
  • This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI's part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
  • • PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff
  • It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence committed
• PSI also liable under NCC 2180
• • It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil

Cruz v. CA

Dr. Ninevetch Cruz v. CA and Lydia Umali

1997 / Francisco / Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision

Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals

FACTS

Medical malpractice suit - type of claim which a victim has available to him/her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm; most often brought as a civil action for damages under NCC 2176 or a criminal case under RPC 365, with which a civil action for damages is impliedly instituted.

Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. Rowena Umali de Ocampo accompanied her mother to the hospital a day before the operation, and they spent the night there. Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed, but Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz said that the operation must go on as scheduled. 

While Lydia's relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet ampules, and Rowena's sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished, but later, Dr. Cruz asked the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for breath--apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other hospital.

In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.

Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali's death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.

Manifestation of negligence

• untidiness of clinic
• lack of provision of supplies
• the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong in the way Dr. Cruz conducted operation
• no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was conducted

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. NO. DR. CRUZ IS ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS STILL CIVILLY LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral damages, 50k exemplary damages).

RATIO

Elements of reckless imprudence

1.     Offender does / fails to do an act

2.     Doing / failure to do act is voluntary

3.     Without malice

4.     Material damage results from reckless imprudence

5.     There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender's employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time, place

Standard of care

Standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science

          When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established by expert testimony.

Expert testimony

Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any expert testimony re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the prosecution only testified as to the possible cause of death.

     While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen are incapable of intelligently evaluating.

Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff

Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused Lydia's death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.

     The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage / hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz' allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz' fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.

Tagatac v. Jimenez

TRINIDAD TAGATAC v. LIBERATO JIMENEZ

1957 / Ocampo / Appeal from CFI judgment

Trinidad Tagatac bought a car for $4,500 in the US, and seven months later, she brought the car to the Philippines. When her friend Joseph Lee came to see her, he was with one Warner Feist who posed as a wealthy man. Seeing that Tagatac seemed to believe him, he offered to buy her car for P15,000, and Tagatac was amenable to the idea. The deed of sale was made, Feist paid by means of a postdated check, and the car was delivered to Feist. When Tagatac tried to encash the check, PNB refused to honor it and told her that Feist had no account in said bank. Tagatac notified the law enforcement agencies of the estafa committed on her by Feist, but he was not apprehended and the car disappeared.

Meanwhile, Feist managed to have the private deed of sale notarized, so he succeeded in having the car’s registration certificate [RC] transferred in his name. He sold the car to Sanchez, who was able to transfer the RC to his name. He offered to sell the car to defendant Liberato Jimenez, who bought the car for P10,000 after investigating in the Motor Vehicles Office. Jimenez delivered the car to the California Car Exchange so that it may be displayed for sale. Masalonga offered to sell the car for Jimenez, so the car was transferred to the former, but when Masalonga failed to sell it right away, he transferred it to Villanueva so he could sell it for Jimenez. Tagatac discovered that the car was in California Car Exchange’s possession, so she demanded from the manager for the delivery of the car, but the latter refused. The RC was retransferred to Jimenez.

Tagatac filed a suit for the recovery of the car’s possession, and the sheriff, pursuant to a warrant of seizure that Tagatac obtained, seized and impounded the car, but it was delivered back to Jimenez upon his filing of a counter-bond. The lower court held that Jimenez had the right of ownership and possession over the car.

JIMENEZ IS A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH; TAGATAC NOT ENTITLED TO POSSESSION

RATIO

The disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act does NOT apply in this case because the car was not stolen from Tagatac, and Jimenez came into possession of the car two months after Feist swindled Tagatac. In addition, when Jimenez acquired the car, he had no knowledge of any flaw in the title of the person from whom he acquired it. It was only later that he became fully aware that there were some questions regarding the car, when he filed a petition to dissolve Tagatac’s search warrant which had as its subject the car in question.

Re: Tagatac’s allegation that the lower court ignored the judgment convicting Feist of estafa, and that it erred in not declaring that restitution of the swindled property must follow, SHE IS WRONG! The lower court noted that Feist was accused of estafa because of the check and NOT because of the delivery of the car.

Her legal basis for the restitution of thing is RPC 104-5¹ . Now the question is WON she has beenunlawfully deprived of her car. It seems like though, but it does not fall under the scope of NCC 599. ²In this case, there is a valid transmission of ownership from true owner [Tagatac] to the swindler [Feist], considering that they had a contract of sale.

As long as no action is taken by the entitled party [annulment / ratification], the contract of sale remains valid and binding. Feist acquired defective and voidable title, but when he sold it to Sanchez, he conferred a good title on the latter. Jimenez bought the car from Sanchez in good faith, for value, and without notice of any defect in Sanchez’ title, so he acquired a good title to the car. Good title means an indefeasible title to the car, even as against original owner Tagatac. As between two innocent parties, the one whose acts made possible the injury must shoulder the consequences thereof.

-------------------------

¹ Civil liability of person who is criminally liable includes restitution of thing even though it is with a third person who acquired it legally
² Although possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person who possesses it.